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Drafi Recommendation
on'WEU's relations wilh Russia
The Assembly,
(i) Considering the importance of the Russian Federation, the main successor to the Soviet Union as a
world power, for the management of international relations and in particular for the establishment of an
order of stability, security and peace at world and European level;
(ii) Gratified that Russia is no longer a threat to the security of Western Europe, but recalling neverthe-
less that, in terrns of conventional and nuclear armaments, it is still the greatesf military powei in Europe
and still has the largest army and the highest defence budget of all the countries of Europe;
(iii) 
_Recalling that after the withdrawal of the last military units from the states of Central Europe, Rus-
sia still maintains troops in at least ten member countries in the Commonwealth of Independent States(crs);
(iv) Considering that the Russian Federation is, on the one hand, at a difficult juncture in the consolida-
tiog gf its internal political, economic and social situation and, on the other hand, at a stage where it is
defining its r6le in the world with particular regard to its place in a new security architecture in Europe;(v) Convilced that such a security architecture in Europe is inconceivable without the participation of
the Russian Federation in the process of concerting approaches in the various international bodits desti-
ned to sffengthen confidenceo stability and collective security, particularly in the frarnework of the CSCE,
NACC and the parhership for peace;
(yi) Also convinced thatthe improvement in the domestic economic sinration in Russia is an important
factor for strengthening political stability and security on the Eurasian continent;
(vii) Believing it essential to consolidate democracy and respect for human righs in Russia;
(viii) Callng consequently for the conditions to be created without delay for Russia to be associated with
the work of the appropriate international organisations for economic and financial co-operation;
(be) Wshing relations between the Russian Federation and European authorities and countries partici-
pating in the process of European integration to be governed by the principle of parfirership and co-opera-
tion;
@ Welc_oming, therefore, the conclusion of an agreement of partnerslup and co-operation benveen theEuropean Union and Russia;
@i) Beligying that WEU as defence component of the European Union and European pillar of theAtlantic Alliance must also improve its relations with the Russian Federation;
(xii) Convinced that the new relations with Russia should result in a permanent system for information,
dialogue and consultation and also co-operation in specific areas of mutual interest;
(xiii) Erlphasising the impo4ance of establishing contacts and dialogue between the WEU Assembly and
the trvo chambers of the Russian Parliament;
(xiv) Consequently welcoming the re-establishment of a regular interparliamentary dialogue in the fra-
mework of these new relations;
(n) Sftessing the importance of the conffolled dismantlement of nuclear and chemical armaments on
Russian territory and that of the CIS in conformity with the international treaties in force;
(mi) Concerned at the dangers that might stem from possible shortcomings in the confrol of Russian
nuclear arms and the clandestine traffic of Russian nuclear material abroad;
(.ruii) Insisting tlat all activities in crisis-management and the maintenance and re-establishment of peace
in crisis areas in the territory of the CIS should be conducted in conformity with the rules frxed by thd Uni-
ted Nations and the CSCE and in co-ordination with those bodies;
(xviii)Also wishing the appropriate western organisations and their member countries to show greater
readiness in providing assistance in maintaining orre-establishing peace in the crisis areas mentionedibove;
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(xix) Calling the attention of the Council in particular to the consequences of present developments in the
Caucasus and in the Tirkish-speaking republics of the CIS for the future evolution of relations between
Russia and Tirkey;
(n) Wishing WEU to start a specific dialogue with the Russian Federation for harmonising their res-
pective concepts concerning the future development of the CSCE, particularly in the light of the summit
meeting that organisation is preparing to hold in Budapest;
(nil Emphasising that outstanding questions between Russia and Ukraine should be settled to the satis-
faction of both sides, respecting the sovereignty and independence of each one;
(xrii) Wishing the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) to continue to develop in such a way as to
become a factor of security and stability from which all its member countries might benefit;
(xxiii) Wishing all the problems of neighbourliness between Russia and the countries that have become
associate partners of WEU to be resolved with due respect for the principles of international law and to the
satisfaction of all the partners concerned in such a way as to increase security and stability in the regions
in question;
(xsciv) Convinced that co-operation between WEU and Russia in the framework of the implementation of
the Open Skies Treaty should be a prelude to the enlargement of this co-operation to other specific areas;
(xxv) Emphasising the importance of establishing close relations between the appropriate Russian
research institutes in security and defence and the WEU Institute for Security Studies,
Rscot"fluEllDs rI{Ar ms CouNctr-
1. Offer the Russian Federation pennanent co-operation including a regular system for information,
dialogue and political consultation at ministerial level and at that of the chairmanship-in-office, the Secre-
tary-General and senior officials of the ministerial organs of WEU;
2. Determine, in co-ordination with the Russian authorities, the specific areas in which WEU might
offer the Russian Federation practical co-operation that might include questions within the purview of
WEAG and possibly space questions;
3. Offer its good offices to the Russian Federation:
(a) n its struggle against the clandestine proliferation of Russian nuclear material by creating ajoint WEU-Russia monitoring committee;
(b) for implementing the destruction of Russian arsenals of chemical weapons;
4. Offer, in co-ordination with the CSCE and using the framework of the conference on the stability
pact, its good ofEces for facilitating the settlement of all problems of neighbourliness remaining between
the Russian Federation and certain countries that have become associate partners of WEU and which
might jeopardise security in the regions in question;
5. Encourage its Institute for Security Studies to increase its contacts and co-operation with the appro-
priate Russian research institutes in the field of security policy;
6. Establish with Ukraine and Belarus similar relations to those proposed in paragraphs I and 2.
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Drafi Ord.er
on reldions between WEU o.nd Russia
The Assembly,
(i) Emphasising the importance of establishing a regular dialogue between the WEU Assembly and the
trvo chambers of the Russian Parliament in the framework of increasing relations between WEU and
Russia;
(ii) Consequently, wishing the contacts estabtshed between the WEU Assembly and the Russian Par-
liament on the occasion of the visit by a delegation from this parliament to Paris from 17th to l9th Octo-
ber 1994 and the visit by the Political Committee to Moscow from 24th to29th October to be followed by
the establishment of regular meetings outside plenary sessions of the Assembly,
Ilrvrres rrs PResoEIrtrrAL Courr,rrrree
1 . To take a decision allowing the exchange of views started with the two chambers of the Russian Par-
liament to be pursued on the basis of regular meetings, specifying the regularity and ways and means of
the participation of the committees of the Assembly in such meetings;
2. To ask the President of the Assembly to transmit appropriate proposals to the Presidents of the two
chambers of the Russian Parliarnent;
3. To study the possibilities of establishing a similar dialogue with:
(a) the parliamentary Assembly of the CIS;
(b) rhe Parliament of Ukraine;
(c) the Parliament of Belarus.
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Explanalory Memorandum
(submified by Mn Baumel" Rapporteur)
I. Introduction
1. Drawing up guidelines forthe development
of relations between WEU and Russia might
appear a very ambitious, indeed overly ambitious
project. For until now sufficiently clear points of
reference have been lacking which might form the
basis of a specifically " WEU " policy towards a
country which regards itself as the principal heir
to the defunct Soviet empire, now in the midst of
transformation and still searching for its identity
and r6le on the international scene.
2. During the final phase of the Soviet
Union's existence, initiatives by the WEU Assem-
bly permitted the development of a regular dia-
logue between the Presidential Committee and the
committees with a political function and represen-
tatives of the Supreme Soviet, even before the
WEU ministerial organs had established their ini-
tial contacts at governmental level with the Soviet
leaders. It should be recalled that this dialogue
was started in April 1987 with the visit by a dele-
gation of the Bureau of the Assembly to Moscow
which had been assessed from the political point
of view in the report presented to the Assembly by
Mr. P6criaux at the plenary session in autumn
19871. With the collapse of the Soviet Union it
proved difficult, if not impossible, to resume
regularparliamentary dialogue and, for a time, the
attitude of the Russians to WEU seemed to waver
between ignorance and indifference and a degree
of mistrust.
3. However, certain recent indications would
seem to suggest that the Russian authorities wish
to intensify the dialogue with WEU and establish
special relations with the organisation. The cha-
racter of these remains to be defined, based on
mutual interests that the two parties are to make
known. Under the present circumstances, WEU is
in point of fact the only western organisation
which has no institutionalised relations with Rus-
sia. The European Union has just signed a wide-
ranging partnership and co-operation agreement
with that counfiry which provides, inter alia, for
political dialogue to " bring about an increasing
convergence of positions on international issues
of mutual concern, thus increasing security and
stability; " (Article 6 of the agreement).
4. The Atlantic Alliance has also established
relations with Russia, offering the latter participa-
tion within the framework of the North Atlantic
Council. Russia also decided to join the partner-
ship for peace programme which NATO proposed
at its last summit meeting to all states participa-
ting in the work of NACC and o'other CSCE
countries able and willing to contribute to this
programme ".
5. WEU has therefore several reasons for
wishing to determine the aim, nature and scope of
the relations which it can and should enter into
with Russia. The fust of these is based on WEU's
calling and function as an integral part of the pro-
cess of European Union and as the European pillar
of NATO, which make WEU the nucleus of a
European security and defence identity. In initially
offering the nine Central and Eastern European
countries a Forum of Consultation within WEU,
then a status of association within the organisation,
WEU has demonsfrated in a meaningful way how
it intends to shape the outlines of a European secu-
rity order that includes a specific and determinate
number of Central European countries 
- 
a percep
tibly different concept from that chosen by NATO
through NACC and the partnership for peace.
6. Russia cannot remain indifferent to WEU's
approach at a time when that country is in the pro-
cess of developing its own concepts in relation to
a new European security order, since this approach
includes the tfuee Baltic countries that formed
part of the former Soviet Union and were, until
now, regarded by Russia as oo near abroad o' coun-
tries in spite of their refusal to join the Common-
wealth of Independent States (CIS). Moreover,
WEU's approach does not include countries like
Belarus and Ukraine, or indeed Russia itself and
the other CIS member countries.
7. However, there is another factor strengthe-
ning the need to establish an intensified dialogue
with the Russian Federation: already with respect
to the three Baltic states and Poland, which became
associated partner countries of WEU, but also
with the imminent enlargement of the European
Union to include three Scandinavian countries
and the prospects thus opened to the latter of
becoming either full members or observers of
WEU, the emergence is apparent of a new deve-
lopment whereby the European Union (and per-
haps WEU) and Russia will, in the foreseeable
future, become direct neighbours with a common
border over 2 000 km in length.
l. See the report on recent developments in Soviet external
policy presented on behalf of the General Affairs Committee
by Mr. P6criaux, Rapporteur, Document 1111, l5th October
1987.
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8. However, the question is not merely limi-
ted to relations between neighbours. It is above
all a matter of reaching a more specific mutual
understanding of the way in which Western
Europe and Russia each regards their own and
the other's place, calling and r6le in the world
and in the management of international pro-
blems, with the specific concern of sffengthen-
ing international security and stability. Western
Europe and Russia are both at a srage ofredefi-
ning their r6le in the world, the first with the
objective of becoming a credible player in world
events on the basis of a true common policy, the
second facing the challenge of once again find-
ing a r6le that enables it to fill the vacuum left
by collapse of the Soviet Union and which
reflects the fact that Russia still represents one
of the major world powers. However, the signals
emitted by the huge geographical area occupied
by the twelve of the successor countries of the
Soviet Union, of which Russia is the powerhou-
se, are still too contradictory and too incoherent
to enable a clear idea to be obtained of the direc-
tion which Russia and the Commonwealth of
Independent States are about to take.
9. The main purpose of the visit the Political
Committee made to Moscow from 24th to 29th
October 1994 was therefore to gather more
detailed information on the political situation in
that country, the working of the various organs
of state and their co-operation and, above all,
the foreign and security policy of the Russian
Federation. The committee's various exchanges
of views with the Vice-President of the Duma,
the appropriate committees of the Duma, the
Council of the Federation, representatives of the
ministry for foreign affairs, defence and co-ope-
ration of the countries of the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS), and also representa-
tives of the Institute of Europe and the Institute
of International Relations were most instructive.
These meetings, however, also showed that
many questions were still outstanding and that
much remained to be done to increase reciprocal
knowledge and understanding. This visit should
therefore be considered as the start of a dialogue
that should be pursued in a more regular
manner.
II. The situatian in Russia
10. Through the parliamentary elections held
on 12th December 1993 and the adoption of its
frst democratic constitution based on a multi-
party system, a market economy and civil rights,
Russia has doubtless taken an important step
towards democracy. The constitution rests on
the principle of the separation of powers, with a
very strong centralised executive power in the
hands of the President, while the powers of par-
liament, which comprises two chambers, are
relatively limited. However, it is still difficult to
ascertain, in practice, who really governs the
country. A very important question seen from
the outside is who is responsible for defining its
strategic policy in general and its foreign policy
in particular. Is it the President alone and his
minister for foreign affairs? What is the extent
of parliament's influence? What r6le does the
Security Council of the Federation of Russia
play? The constitution is, unfortunately, unclear
on these points. Even at the level of the executi-
ve, it is not easy to understand the operation of
the present system where power is shared bet-
ween the President and the goveflrment. What is
the r6le of the army which is still deployed in
the majority of Russia's neighbouring coun-
tries?
ll. After the departure of the last Russian
military units from Estonia, Germany and
Lithuania on 31st August 1994 and signature of
the agreement, on 10th August 1994, between
the negotiators on behalf of Moldova and Russia
for the withdrawal over a period of three years
of the fourteenth Russian army, stationed in East
Moldova, Russia still maintains troops in Bela-
rus (25 000-30 000), in Ukraine (approximately
17 000), in Georgia (approximately 5 000), in
Armenia (approximately 9 000), in Azerbaijan
(approximately 5 00), in Turkmenistan (approxi -
mately 15 000), in Kazakhstan (approximately
1 000), in Uzbekistan (approximately 5 000), in
Kirgizstan (approximately 3 500) and in Tajikis-
tan (approximately 24 OOD)'z.
12. However, above all, it is the uncertain
future of the Russian army once repatriated insi-
de the borders of the Russian Federation that is
tending increasingly to cause problems for the
counfiry's domestic policy. During the cold war
period, the Soviet army, on the strength of an
offensive military doctrine, played a leading
r6le; present in all the component parts of the
Soviet Union and in the majority of Warsaw Pact
countries, in 1989 it still numbered 4.2 million
troops. On 5th May 1992, the 'o official
birthday " of Russia's armed forces, it numbered
only 2.8 million and this figure had fallen to 2.2
million n 1994. Between now and the end of the
year, its number will fall to 1.9 million and then
subsequently to 1.5 million3. Furthermore, the
fact that the troops are available only in part due,
on the one hand, to massive desertion and, on the
other, because the inadequacy of logistical
means and poor maintenance of equipment
reduces even further the operational part of the
army. Troops very rarely receive their pay on
time. Conversely, the new KGB and the military
2. The situation in May 1994; figures taken from The Econo-
mist, 2lst May 1994.
3. I* Figaro, 8th September 1994.
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intelligence service, the GRU, have lost none of
their efficiency. Furthermore, the arsenal of stra-
tegic nuclear forces is still in an excellent opera-
tional condition.
13. The crisis in government caused by the
army, the substantial reduction in the defence
budget, the uncertainty as to the future r6le of the
armed forces in a Russia that is no longer invol-
ved in a global confrontation with a strategic
adversary, have all contributed to diminishing
the political and social standing of the ilryo
inevitably causing tension and discontent among
the military. Material factors are also having a
negative impact. Low salaries and delays in pay-
ment, a lack of decent housing for the families of
officers repatriated from abroad, especially from
Germany, although the latter has financed the
building of thousands of housing units in Russia,
are among the factors exploited by various poli-
tical elements seeking to take advantage of the
anger and disappointment evident within the
army.
14. A case in point is Mr. Zhirinovsky, whose
LDP party may have picked up a third of the
military vote4; another is Mr. Aleksandr Rutskoi,
the former Russian Vice-President, who at the
end of May 1994 succeeded in bringing together
the opposition communist and nationalist parties
in a " Front for National Unity ", thus strengthen-
ing an already powerful extra-parliamentary
opposition. Recent rumours and discussions on
the holding of parliamentary elections, which
might be deferred by two years, for fear that the
advocates of reform obtain an even more
mediocre rating in the event of early elections,
are evidence of the difficulties in which those
close to President Yeltsin find themselves.
15. When the question of deferring the elec-
tions of both parliament and president was
brought up during the visit by the Political Com-
mittee to Moscow in October 1994, it aroused
mostly strong opposition. Mr. Karaganov, vice-
director of the reputed Moscow Institute of
Europe and counsellor of President Yeltsin, for
example, said that the postponement of the elec-
tions would be a major blow to democracy in
Russia. Once deferred, nobody would be able to
say authoritatively when they would be held.
16. President Yeltsin's proposal to convene a
" pan-Russian " assembly to discuss questions of
local management and ways of organising the
4. However, a recent poll conducted by the Friedrich Ebert
Foundation among more than 650 officers in the Russian
army whom they trusted revealed that support for Zririnovs-
ky, if it had ever been high at all, had plummeted sharply.
According to the poll, which was published in the Moscow
Tribune of 28th October 1994,70Vo distrust him. The highest
rutrng (58Vo approval) was scored by General t ebed, Com-
mander of the l4th army, currently stationed in the Transd-
niestr region of Moldova.
legislative and executive powers more rationally
has further added to the confusion. Moreover,
rumours abound that a real hand-to-hand
struggle is being played out between the Presi-
dent and the government on the one hand and the
defence minister and the military authorities on
the others. At the root of this crisis are both the
revelations of fraudulent practices in the army
stationed in Germany until the end of Augustl994
and the dissatisfaction of the defence minister
with the meagre budget allocated to him. More
important still, however, is the loss of control by
the political authorities to the military, who are
playing an ever-increasing r6le in the foreign
policy decision-making process. Such is the case
in Moldova where General Lebed, Commander
of the Russian army, conducts his own policy
independently of the usual ministry of defence
hierarchy and in Georgia, where Russian soldiers
have set themselves up as defenders of Russia's
geostrategic interests.
17. During its stay in Moscow, the Political
Committee was able to note the keen tension bet-
ween the Duma and the Russian executive, and
particularly the defence minister, when the
defence ministry refused to receive the commit-
tee at political level. A motion of censure against
the government, only just negatived by the
Duma, had repercussions on the programme
planned by the parliamentary authorities for the
committee's visit, and it was therefore not pos-
sible to go to Sotchi as planned to meet represen-
tatives of the peace-keeping forces in Abkhazia.
The last repercussion of this political crisis was
the Russian President's dismissal on lst Novem-
ber 1994 of Mr. Burlakov, First Deputy Minister
of Defence and former Commander-in-Chief of
Russian forces in Germany.
18. The consequences of the acquittal of Mr.
Valentin Varrenmikov, former Soviet under-secre-
tary for defence and one of the authors of the fai-
led coup of August 1991 against the Soviet Presi-
dent, Mikhail Gorbachev, cannot yet be
accurately assessed. It is clear nevertheless that
this decision strengthens the hand of the former
communists and nationalists grouped around Mr.
Rutskoi, with their incessant claims for the re-
establishment of the former Soviet Union.
19. Although there is no immediate prospect of
conservative forces returning to power in Mos-
cow, the political crisis is still disturbing. Even if
there is temporary stability, one cannot exclude
several possible scenarios that might stem from
the present political crisis. Your Rapporteur
would quote four:
(i) President Yeltsin manages to retain
power;
5. Le Figaro, 30th August 1994.
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(ii) Conservatives and/or nationalist
forces take control;
(iii) kime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin
takes over;
(iv) a chaotic situation arises in which the
army takes over.
20. As to the economic situation in the country,
the indicators and information are conflicting.
What is certain is that the economic crisis is conti-
nuing. The economic system is still marked by
Soviet dirigism, particularly in regional indusrial
centres far from Moscow. Although a reduction in
the inflation rate has been possible, there is as yet
no prospect of a recovery in industrial production.
Rather the reverse 
- 
according to recent research
carried out in Moscow, indusrial production has
again fallen by 27Vo for the frst half of 1994 as
compared with the previous year and the Russian
economy is suffering increasingly from insol-
vency. According to estimates by the Vienna
Research Institute in October 19946,30 million
Russians have incomes below the vital minimum
and 9 million are unemployed. Russians have litt-
le confidence in their economy. The Institute's
experts estimate the drain of capital from the
counfiy at between $5 and $25 billion since the
collapse of the USSR. In the same period, interna-
tional investrnent was less than $2.7 billion.
21. The economic system is still far from per-
fect. Economic activity is at times completely
uncontrolled. The state cannot manage adequately
to protect those in the market and prevent corrup-
tion. Many would like to see a more stable sys-
tem. Regrettably, those who trade on the black
market seem to be the frst to get rich quick. The
underworld elements (" mafia racketeers ") have
naturally no interest in changing the status quo.
The state's weakness is their strength. The more
their political influence grows, the longer it takes
to achieve reform and to establish the rule of law.
To inspire greater confidence in the market sys-
tem, it is necessary to improve and strengttren the
commercial code so as to support the develop-
ment of a spirit of enterprise within an orderly
environment. Moreover, it is absolutely essential
for the rules of commerce to be underpinned by
state guarantee in order to create an attractive cli-
mate for international investment.
22. Moves to establish a private sector are
underway with the implementation of the frst pri-
vatisation phase. In this initial stage, the State dis-
tributed free privatisation vouchers with a face
value of 10 000 roubles to all Russians. It was
intended that these could be traded for company
shares. An entire new class of entrepreneurs
emerged at a stroke in the commercial and service
sectors and then in industry. The business and ser-
vice sectors are the first to take off since they are
not weighed down by the economic heritage of
the old Soviet Union, as is the case, for example,
with indusfiry. The banking system still needs to
be improved and the tax system modernised. The
first cannot offer a system of financing that func-
tions adequately and the second does not bring in
enough revenue to a state which substantially
lacks the financial means to mitigate the social
consequences of radical economic reforms.
Consequently, social inequality is on the increase.
23. After the first private enterprises went
bankrupt on 13th July 1994, parliament, which is
dominated by opponents of the reform, blocked
the implementation of the second privatisation
wave. In this phase of cash sales, Russians would
have been able to sell their vouchers to interested
investors who in turn would have been able to
raise capital. The government was hoping that a
new class of investors would emerge around
banks and insurance or financial groups. The pro-
gramme has now been referred back to the parlia-
mentary committees concerned for review. On
l9th July 1994, President Yeltsin announced that
he would have recourse to a decree if parliament
continued its opposition. A decree might certainly
be one solution; however, given the extent of pri-
vatisation, it would be better to have the support
of the majority of political forces.
24. The description of the process of tansfor-
ming a planned economy into a market economy
given by the Prime Minister of the Czech Repu-
blic, Vaclav Klaus, during the annual session of
the Mont Pdlerin Society in Cannes? is also valid
for the Russian economy. The process of transfor-
mation should be a mix of spontaneify and delibe-
rate action. In other words, the private economic
activities of thousands of participants in the mar-
ket should be conducted freely in an economic
framework fixed by the state. Economic recons-
truction is not the result of the omnipotence of one
group ofrefonners or another. It is therefore in the
interest of the West to support further the deve-
lopment of private business. The more private
enffepreneurship emerges and the more private
property rights are awarded, the higher the pressu-
re on the Russian Government becomes to conti-
nue with economic and democratic reforms. Also,
the higher the price will rise for Russia to pay, if it
decides to march backwards.
25. As to the cohesion of the Russian Federa-
tion, completely contradictory signs are also
observable here. There is evidence ofboth centri-
fugal and centripetal tendencies in a country that
covers more than three quarters of the territory of
the former Soviet Union and houses more than
half its population 
- 
around 148.5 million inhabi-
tants, 8l.5Vo of them Russian. Geographically,
6. Neue ZrurcherZ,eitrung,5th October 1994. 7. Neue Ziircher Zeitung, 5th October 1994.
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Russia is still the largest country in the world,
with a vast wealth of natural and human
resources. More than 25 million Russians now
live outside the borders of the Federation. lnter-
nally, Russia seems to have trouble in defining its
identiry whether at national, state or international
level. History offers no precise guidelines, other
than the fact that Russia has never been a nation
state, but has invariably conducted itself as an
empire. With more than 100 nations and races, it
is a multi-ethnic country which today must carve
out its destiny without reference to the past. Of
very recent birth, in one sense it represents the
world's mostmodern form of state with enormous
reserves of potential. Time alone can tell in which
direction it will turn: towards Europe, the East or
possibly in both directions at once.
26. However, a major preoccupation for its
political leaders is the problem of controlling the
centrifugal forces in evidence in several regions
of the country. From its very foundation, the Rus-
sian Federation has suffered from a degree of
disintegration and is prey to secessionist ele-
ments. The Federation of Russia has 89 parts:
21 republics, six territories, 49 regions, two cities
of federal importance (Moscow and Saint Peters-
burg), one autonomous region and ten autono-
mous districts. The statutes of the parts of the
Federation republics are different. For instance,
the republics have a constitution which enables
them to establish their own structures of power.
Thus, several of them have elected a president
who sometimes develops his own ideas on the
funre of his territory. The integrity of the country
is threatened, particularly by separatist and natio-
nalist tendencies and especially in the Caucasus,
Siberia and the Urals. This phenomenon illus-
ffates Russia's heterogeneity. Moreover, without
being able to offer adequate incentives, the state
can no longer manage adequately to justiff to the
different peoples making up the country why a
strong cenffal leadership should be retained. [t is
not only the prosperous regions that are beginning
to demand the right to organise themselves more
independentlys. Boris Yeltsin has tried to stabilise
the process by offering the separatist regions
agreements Fanting very wide autonomy which,
in his terms, would be tantamount to real federa-
lisme. Tatarstan, a republic in the southern Urals,
with a wealth of oil resources, was the frst to
conclude such an agreement on 15th February
1994, followed on 3rd August 1994by its neigh-
bour, the independent republic of Bachkortostan
which also has oil deposits. The agreements pro-
vide for a greater autonomy in economic decision-
making particularly with regard to the exploita-
tion of petroleum resources.
8. For example, on 10th August 1990, Tatarstan asserted its
sovereignty by claiming the right to exploit its own natuial
resources (Ramses 1992, page 53).
9. Financial Times,4th August 1994.
27. It is perhaps understandable that a country
as large as Russia should never achieve a distribu-
tion of wealth that is completely equal ordevelop-
ment that is entirely even. However, the fact
remains that the various discrepencies in supply,
infrastructure and salaries can threaten the stabil-
ity, peace and existence of Russia. Very often,
such differences of economic and social status
underlie a so-called " ethnic " conflict. Russia
undoubtedly has its share of civil strife, disasters
inflicting heavy losses of human life and damage
to the environmentro and extreme tension between
different populations, both internally and in the
territories of the newly independent republics.
Several cases of violent hostilities, some of them
dating back to early this century and often exacer-
bated down the years as a result of Stalin's policy
of deportation, have either erupted or are current-
ly threatening to do so. These give rise to waves
of refugees which neighbouring countries have
difficulty in absorbing and which add to problems
of secession.
28. Among the latter one might note in particu-
lar the Chechen rebellion under the leadership of
the former head of the Soviet airforce, Major
Dzhokhar Dudaev, who assumed the presidency
in October 1991 following elections that were
probably rigged. An independent Muslim repu-
blic was proclaimed on 23rd November 1994.
Chechenya had been conquered by the Russian
Empire in the nineteenth century. Although the
Russian Government decreed a state of emergen-
cy in the region at the end of 1991 and maintained
an economic blocade against the self-proclaimed
republic, refusing to grant it independence, it had,
nevertheless, for a considerable time remained
virtually silent, trying, without any real success,
to establish an opposition government. It changed
its policy at the end of June 1994 statngthat Che-
chenya was the major destabilising factor in the
northern Caucasus " and that the time had come to
take definite decisions12. The government did not,
however, speciff the content of these decisions in
detail, while ruling out Russian military action.
On 8th August 1994, Nl[t. Dudaev declared him-
self ready to give up power if Russia and the inter-
national community recognised the Chechen
republic's independence. So far, no counffy has
recognised the break-away republic. Moscow
seems to be supporting the provisional Council,
an opposition group led by businessman Oumar
Avturkhanov. He is to control a part of the territo-
ry of the Chechen republic, namely the Nachte-
retchni district. The Chechen Government has
10. For instance, the recent oil spill in Usinsk due to poor
maintenance of an oil pipeline or the catastrophic shrinking
of the Aral sea, now belonging to Kazakhstan and Uzbekis-
tan, caused by the diversion by Soviet authorities ofits feeder
waters for irrigation purposes.
11. Le Figaro,3rdAugust 1994.
12. Neue ZiNcherZeiung,4th August 1994.
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ried to involve TLrkey in this dispute by asking
President Demirel to help the Chechen people in
their struggle for independence and freedom'3.
Also of note is the independence claim put for-
ward by the national Council of the Balkars
people'o and the intention Eduard Rossel, Presi-
dent of the Sverdlosvk Oblast Dum4 has stated of
creating an independent republic of the Urals's.
29. There are doubtless limits, both theoretical
and practical, to the pursuit ofthe process offede-
ralisation in Russia. Firstly, although there are
over 100 nations and ethnic groupings on Russian
territory these are numerically too few to consti-
tute a true majority among the populations of the
territories they claim under the right of self-deter-
mination of peoples. Only in Dagestan, Kabardino-
Balkaria, Northern Osseti4 Chechenya, Tchuva-
chia and Tirva do such majorities exist'r6. How can
these autonomous republics be prevented from
again splitting up in iesponse to demands from
increasingly tiny and localised nations or ethnic
groupings? It seems highly dangerous to combine
the right of self-determination with that to secede.
The suggestion of allowing all the inhabitans of a
particular region and notjust those of a given eth-
nic grouping to vote on its independence would
not resolve the problem. This would ignore the
deportations and displacement of populations car-
ried out during the years of Soviet rule, which
have substantially changed the compositions of
the populations of such regions.
30. We have already noted that regions with
abundant resources were the fnst to claim inde-
pendence. Others could certainly not survive
without " outside " support from Russia, not
necessarily confined exclusively to those without
a border with a third counfiry. Does agreement on
independent federal status not therefore depend
more on a local concentration of a particular
people than on a traditional demarcation of a
region regardless of its inhabitants? For Russia,
the reply to that question may become crucial to
its survival. Analysis leads to one important
conclusion: Moscow today fully controls only a
part of Russian territory.
III. The foreign policy of the
Russian Federalion
3I. Following the accession to independence
of fifteen republics that emerged from the collap-
se of the Soviet Union, Russia experienced a
degree of difficulty in deciding whether it should
regard itself as a European, an Asiatic or a Eur-
13. Neue ZtrcherZniing,5th October 1994.
14. RFURL News Briefs, 20th-24th June 1994, page2.
15. RFE/RL News Briefs, 16th-20th May,1994, page2.
16. Christoph Mich Probleme des Ftideralismus in Russland,
Osteuropa, July 1994, page 612.
asian counbry or quite simply as a power with glo-
bal ambitions. The deterrnining factors will be the
evolution of the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS) and the way in which Russia inter-
prets the purpose of this grouping, initially foun-
ded on 8th December 1991 by the Minsk accord,
signed by the Presidents of Belarus, Russia and
Ukraine.
32. On 21st December 1991, eleven of the fif-
teen former Soviet Socialist Republics (minus the
three Baltic countries and Georgia) joined the
CIS, envisaged as a voluntary association of equal
and sovereign states, certain of whose structures
have only gradually come into being. The major
trends in its development are, as is often the case
on this massive continent, contradictory, oscilla-
ting benveen centifugal and cenftipetal tenden-
cies. However, the CIS has seen a remarkable
strengthening of its r0le. Initially, it seemed very
weak. After its foundation in 1991, the newly-
independent republics joined the commonwealth
only very reluctantly. They suspected Moscow of
wanting to use it as a means of restoring the posi-
tion of the former Soviet Union. They themselves
viewed the CIS rather as the instrument of a pea-
ceful and controlled separation from the former
USSR. Consequently, unlike Russia, which has
always sought to strengthen the CIS, the other
countries were reluctant when it came to conclu-
ding agreements on important matters. The mem-
ber countries could not, for example, reach in-
depth agreement on security questions, economic
and monetary co-operation or co-ordination of
their reform policies. Additionally, the eastern
republics of the old Soviet Union began to evolve
in an opposite direction with their projected parti-
cipation in the Economic Co-operation Organisa-
tion (ECO), originally founded by Tirkey, Pakis-
tan and Iran. Turkmenistan is much sought after
by kan and Twkey. Indeed, the latter is making
enthusiastic overtures to all Turkish-speaking
republics and the Gagauz minority, a people of
Turkish origin in southern Moldova. At the
second summit meeting of the Tlrkish-speaking
republics 
- 
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan,
Tirkey, Tirkmenistan and Uzbekistan 
- 
the heads
of state atrinned their intention to strengthen their
relations independently of Moscow. While,
admittedly, some 350 agreements have been
signed under the auspices of the CIS, no impor-
tant agreement has yet been signed by all the
member countries. Furthermore, the republics
have often taken the liberty of amending or of
ignoring the decisions of the Council of presidents
or of prime ministers.
33. The basic CIS document is its Charter,
signed on22nd January 1993 in Minsk by seven
countries: Armeniao Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kir-
gizstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. This
stipulates, frst, that the CIS is based on the sove-
reign equality of a1l its members and that it is not
10
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a state; nor does it include supranational elements.
The Charter contains two important chapters on
collective security and military co-operation and
conflict-prevention between member countries;
these chapters envisage the creation of a Council
at heads-of-state level for defence and protection
of the foreign borders of member countries. It also
established a Council of Defence Ministers and a
high command of the united armed forces. Final-
ly, a CIS parliamentary Assembly was created,
which sits in Saint Petersburg.
34. On several occasions, the member countries
of the CIS have stated that they were prepared to
create a defence union, but they have not yet
concluded an agreement in this sense. Admittedly,
there is the Treaty of Tashkent on collective secu-
rity, but in May 1992, the freaty had been signed
by only six members of the CIS: ArmenianYtaza-
khstan, Kirgizstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbe-
kistan. Later, Azerbaijan, Belarus and Georgia fol-
lowed suit. When Annenia attempted to invoke it,
no reaction was forthcoming from the signatory
countries'?. Today, the Eeaty, which includes an
article establishing a very restrictive assistance
obligation, has still not been ratified by all the par-
liaments of the signatory states and it has still not
been signed by Moldov4 Ukraine and Tlrkmenis-
tan. Moreover, the new republics, including Russia
but excepting Kirgizstan, have created their own
armies. They have abolished the Soviet army and
replaced it by the " armed forces of the CIS " with
a fairly weak joint military command and without
any operational basis for the time being.
35. What are the factors that militate in favour
of the evolution of the CIS and for strengthening
its r6le? First, Russia has meanwhile succeeded in
integrating all the new republics, with the excep-
tion of the Baltic countries, into the CIS 18. More-
over, Russia has sought to make the CIS accep-
table to the international community as a regional
or international organisation and has requested
financial support from the United Nations. The
West's reluctance to become involved in the
conflicts raging in the former Soviet republics,
particularly in the Caucasus and Moldovao has
encouraged Russia to firy to assign itself a peace-
keeping r61e, with or without the agreement of the
United Nations, with or without the agreement of
the CSCE or with the more or less willing agee-
ment of the other members of the CIS. The fact
that most of the latter refused to take part in
peace-keeping operations with the Russians, in
particular in Georgia or in Tajikistan, even streng-
thened Russia's r6le in peace-keeping in the terri-
tory of the CIS. If Russia were to succeed in
convincing the international community to grant
17. Ramses 1994, page lM.
18. Moldova has never ratified the Treary of Minsk, the foun-
ding document of the CIS, however, it participates more or
less firlly in CIS structures.
the CIS an identical status to that, for example, of
the Organisation of African Unity, which has car-
ried out numerous peace-keeping interventions, it
would have an instrument that enabled it to
conceal its international ambitions behind a res-
pectable organisation.
36. At the institutional level, the Russian
Government in January 1994 sfressed the impor-
tance it attached to the CIS by creating a ministry
for co-operation with its member countries. Both
chambers of parliament created committees for
CIS affairs 
- 
which had not existed under the pre-
vious parliament 
- 
that of the Duma also being res-
ponsible for ties with fellow countrymen. Vladimir
Shumeiko, President of the Russian Federal Coun-
cil and the interparliamentary Assembly of the CIS
and close to President Yeltsin, requested on 29th
July 1994 that co-operation between the member
countries of the CIS be intensified. In his opinion,
such co-operation would be followed by the crea-
tion of a confederation of CIS member statesre.
37. As regards co-operation in security matters,
Russia has let it be known that it would be ready to
go even further. It has put forward a proposal for a
military alliance that could extend nuclear cover to
the newly-independent countries, specifically by
grouping counfiies in possession of nuclear wea-
pons @elarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine), but also
the other CIS member countries nearest to Russiam.
There are reasons for fearing that Russia is increa-
singly succeeding in dominating the CIS, while
reinforcing and restructuring it as an international
organisation. Thus it will find in the latter a very
usefrrl adjunct to its international ambitions.
38. However, Russia's interest in extending its
influence over its neighbours has limits. In the
face of the enormous economic difficulties the
new republics, particularly Belarus and Ukraine,
are experiencing and reacting to a proposal for
monetary union with Belarus specifically, the
Russian Government made quite clear that it
would not be prepared to finance their budget
deficits. This astonishing fact was apparent to all
before the presidential elections in Belarus and in
Ukraine, when all the major opposition candidates
declared themselves in favour of the re-establish-
ment of closer relationships between their coun-
tries and Russia. For similar economic reasons,
Moscow continues to oppose the entry of Tajikis-
tan into the rouble curency area2'. The Russian
Government is therefore aware that the cost of
19. RFE/RL News Briefs, 25th-29th July 1994/lst-5th
August 1994,page 10.
20. lntemational Herald Tribune, 3lst August 1994.
21. Demonstrating the struggle within the Russian authorities
to agree on a coherent policy with respect to the CIS member
states is President Yeltsin's harsh comment on those suppor-
ting a tough fiscal and monetary policy that so far has exclu-
ded Tajikistan from the rouble currency area. President Yelt-
sin strongly supported Tajikistan's wish to join the rouble
zone. Financial Times,22nd October 1994.
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maintaining a traditional imperialist policy might
be too heavy for the Russian people to bear. It is
highly unlikely that Russia will succeed in estab-
lishing a thriving democratic state and a market
economy if it continues to fritter a large part of its
resources away outside the country instead of
concentrating on reconstruction at home. It also
seems clear ttrat systematic destabilisation of the
economies on the periphery of Russia would
deftact from this goal.
39. Nevertheless, efforts to create a new execu-
tive body of the CIS with the task of sffengthening
its economic union, possibly leading to financial
union, have led to a decision by the member coun-
ffies at the CIS summit meeting on 21st October
1994 to form an inter-state economic commiffee.
The supranational body, in which Russia will
control 50Vo of the votes while decisions are taken
by an 807o vote, will be based, unlike other CIS
structures presiding in Minsk, in Moscow. The
ultimate goal of the committee is to create a cus-
toms union and a payments union within the CIS.
However, many of the signatory states retained
the right to opt out of the agreement and the
Ukrainian Prime Minister, Mr. Vitaly Masol,
immediately declared that Ukraine would not take
part in the payments unionz.
40. Although Russia's interest in a stable CIS
currently seems limited to the desire to see it
develop for its own benefit as an effective econo-
mic entity, the last summit of the CIS member
countries in Moscow proved the continuation of a
trend which has been visible for some time now:
Moscow is making itself more and more the
centre of the CIS, its ulterior motive being that in
future this may lead to fulI reintegration of CIS
territory around Moscow. Such calls come not
only from Russia but also from various CIS mem-
ber countries.
41. In September 1994, Russia's head of foreign
intelligence, Evgueni Primakov, published a
report entitled " Russia 
- 
CIS, must the West
change its approach? ", in which he considered
that the CIS would be the only organisation
capable of avoiding nationalist, authoritarian or
fundamentalist tendencies among all the members
of the CIS.
42. During talks the Political Committee held
in Moscow in October 1994 with Mr. Medvedev,
vice-Minister for co-operation with CIS states, he
and his aides supported a proposal, initially put
forward by the Kazakh President Nursultan
Nasarbaiev, to form a Eurasian Co-operation
Council with stricter rules of adherence and stron-
ger political and economic ties. Membership rules
would also include the provision of human rights
standards and the condition that member states
must be free of civil war. However, they admitted
that respective plans were far from being achieved
and that even Russia would have diffrculties in
meeting the proposed criteria.
43. The causes of CIS's evolution are still to be
assessed, particularly in view of the fact that in
certain CIS regions, centrifugal forces continue to
present the Moscow leadership with difficult pro-
blems: for example, fighting has continued bet-
ween Armenia and Azerbaijan for six years in
Nagorno-Karabakh, an enclave in western Azer-
baijan whose population is roughly SOVo Arme-
nian. The Nagorno-Karabakh enclave and the
Azeri enclave of Nakhichevan in Armenia, which
Armenia has claimed since 1987, were created by
the l92I treaty between Turkey and the Soviet
Union. The two parties to the conflict have com-
mitted atrocities which have cost thousands of
lives. Today, Armenia occupies 28Vo of Azeri ter-
ritory. Armenians living in Azerbaijan had to flee
the country to Armenia while Azeris living in
Arrnenia moved towards Azerbaijan. In Decem-
ber 1991, the Armenian region declared indepen-
dence. Russia proposed deployment of its buffer
forces, but Azerbaijan demanded that peace-
keeping forces be sent that were drawn from the
CSCE, particularly from the member countries of
the Minsk mediators group. Azeri authorities have
often accused Russia of backing Armenian forces.
A Russian peace plan currently envisages
independent status for Nagorno-Karabakh. The
signing, on 20th September 1994, of an oil
contract between Azerbaijan and a western majo-
rity oil consortium revived tension between Mos-
cow and Baku after the Russian Minister for
Foreign Affairs made it known that he did not
recognise the agreement23. Clearly, Moscow
wishes to keep strategic control over trade in and
ffansportation of oil in the region.
M. Several flashpoints exist in Georgi4 parti-
cularly in the Abkhaziaand South Ossetia regions
where violent hostilities broke out in 1993. Until
now, only the Ajaria region has remained at peace
- 
albeit a very uncertain peace. Russia is suspec-
ted of having for a time supported the rebel
regions to put pressure on the government of Pre-
sident Shevardnadze. President Shevardnadze
replaced the first President of Georgia, Zviad
Gamsakhurdia in 1992, under highly suspicious
circumstances. Mr. Gamsakhourdia had been
elected President of Georgia in May 1991. Rus-
sian forces took up positions close to the River
Inguri, with the go-ahead, after the event, of the
United Nations, to monitor a truce befween the
Abkhazian secessionists and the Georgian
Government2a. The conflicts in the Caucasus are
threatening to extend to the Kuban region in the
23. L,e Monde, 22nd September 1994.
24. On 2lst Jrtrly 1994, the United Nations Security Council
requested the deployment of Russian forces for peace-
keeping in Abkhazia.22.Frnancial Times, 22nd October 1994.
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North, which supplies Russia with a large part of
its cereal consumption.
45. A bloody civil war broke out in Tajikistan
in 1992. At the origin of this conflict was a
confrontation between the representatives of the
former Soviet r6gime and the opposition Islamic-
democratic alliance, which has now taken refuge
in Afghanistan. In September 1991, the opposi-
tion succeeded in taking control of the country,
but was then ousted, with support from Russia
and Uzbekistan, by the government of the Presi-
dent of the Supreme Soviet, Enomali Rakhmonov.
Uzbekistan contributed to bringing the situation
under conffol since it feared that the one million
Uzbeks or so living in Tajikistan might take refu-
ge in Uzbekistan. President Rakhmonov stands
accused of subjecting the population to a highly
authoritarian rdgime. The country is suffering
from the chaotic way in which he handles econo-
mic policy. In May 1993, Tajikistan and Russia
signed a friendship and co-operation treaty. The
agreement included military assistance to the
Rakhmonov government. Since August 1993,
Russian forces with some support from troops
from three CIS member countries, Uzbekistan,
Kazakhstan and Kirgizstan, have been helping the
present government to protect Tajikistan's border
with Afghanistan and avoid infiltration from
Afghanistan. Negotiations carried out under Uni-
ted Nations' auspices to bring about a cease-fire
between the opposing sides have been unsuccess-
fuI. The Tajiks, a people with language and cultu-
ral ties with Iran, account for roughly 6O7o of the
population of the counfiry.
46. ln Moldova, the fourteenth Russian army,
stationed in Transdniesh, in the east of the coun-
flT, and led by the very General Lebeds, sided
with the Russian-speaking inhabitants of that
area, when, in June 1992, the Moldovan Govern-
ment tried to establish control over the territory by
force. In September 1991, the Russian-speaking
inhabitants had demanded independent status for
the territory on the left bank of the River Dniestr
in the east of the country (Dniestr Republic).
Since 1990, skirmishes between Moldovan natio-
nalists and Russian-speaking separatists, particu-
larly in eastern Moldova, have become increasin-
gly frequent. About 800 000 of the Moldovan
population of 4.4 million live in the Transdniestr
region. The rest of Moldova was part of Romania
until the second world war. The main language
there is Romanian. However, Russian- and Roma-
nian-speaking groups live on both sides of the
Dniestr river. The presence of several very impor-
tant Russian military bases confers a major geos-
Eategic interest on the region in the eyes of Rus-
sia, which is seeking to preserve a sphere of
in-fluence in the region between the Black Sea and
the Balkans. The Moldovan Government is
demanding the withdrawal of the Russian forces,
but the majority of the soldiers of the fourteenth
army who come from Transdniestr are opposed to
it26. The agreemento signed on 10th August 1994,
between the Moldovan and Russian negotiators,
on the withdrawal within three years of troops sta-
tioned in eastern Moldova, where the majority of
the inhabitants are Russian or Ukrainian, leaves
open the question of the status of this so-called
Dniestr Republic. The text of the treaty states
merely that the withdrawal will be synchronised
with definition of a special status for the Moldo-
van territory of Transdniestr2T. Chances to unify
the split country are weak. The Moldovan
Government accuses Romania of further compli-
cating the issue, referring to Romanian declara-
tions that deny the existence of Moldovan natio-
nality and claim that Moldova was a part of
Romaniar.
47. As to the Caucasus region, in 1993 Russia
succeeded in obtaining the accession of Georgia
and Azerbaijan to the CIS, in return for support to
the governments concerned. Georgia even accep-
ted the presence of military bases on its territory.
In June 1993, the Georgian President, Eduard
Shevardnadze, after months of calls for interven-
tion by international ffoops under United Nations
auspices going unheeded, became so desperate
that he yielded to Russian ffoops being stationed
in order to control the border between Georgia
and Abkhazia. As western nations took no interest
in the issue, the United Nations Security Council
decided, on 2lst July 1994, to authorise Russia to
keep the peace in this conflict. Moscow now
hopes to obtain a similar mandate to deploy Rus-
sian peace-keeping forces in Nagorno-Karabakh.
The United States Government has already decla-
red that it would not oppose this2e. [n Georgia, in
particular, Russia has succeeded, with the unwit-
ting help of western countries not only in justi-
fying its mittary presence there but also in achie-
ving other ends 30: firstly, maintaining access to
the Black Sea and the Georgian ports; second,
accession by Georgia to the CIS and the retention
of Russian military bases located on Georgian ter-
ritory; third, protecting access to Armenia; fourth,
stabilising its frontier with the Caucasus and, last-
ly, protecting the frontier between Tirrkey and
Georgia.
48. Other neighbours of Russia are subjected to
Russian political pressure by other means. The
26. In the New York Times of 24th October 1994, General
Lebed said that " they were bom here " and that " they will
stay and call themselves the 'National Liberation Army' ".
27. Le Monde, l2th August 1994.
28. New York Times, 28th October 1994.
29. t,e Figaro, llth August 1994.
30. Allen Lynch, Der Einfluss des Militiirs auf die Aussenpo-
litik Russlands, Europa-Archiv, Folge 1511995, pages 441-
442.
l3
25. See footnote 3.
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Baltic countries, Ukraine and Belarus, have often
suffered from the fact that they were economical-
ly dependent on Russia. In regard to the Black Sea
Fleet and the resulting dispute with Ulaaine, Rus-
sia has openly pursued an arbirary policy towards
its energy supplies.
49. The problem of managing the various
conflicts on CIS territory has also influenced Rus-
sia's attitude in the framework of the discussions
within the United Nations and the CSCE on the
r6le of regional organisations in crisis-prevention
and management and particularly as regards
peace-keeping and peace-enforcement. There is,
at least theoretically, a basic rule at CIS level for
peace-keeping operations. This is the collective
security agreement signed in Kiev in March 1992,
followed, on 28th September 1993, by the Tash-
kent protocol on collective peace-keeping forces.
However, none of the current operations quite fits
in the framework of these agreements. The Kiev
agreement requires that a truce be signed and that
all parties to the conflict accept the deployment of
buffer forces. This was not the case when CIS
forces intervened on Tajikistan's frontier with
Afghanistan3t. Furthermore, the Kiev agteement
only allows the use of ftoops of countries that are
not party to the conflict. However, until now, CIS
peace-keeping forces have invariably been made
up of nationals of countries parties to the conflict,
among them Russia32. Indeed, peace-keeping
policy is, for Russia, a means of preserving its
influence over neighbouring countries. It is also
2a instrurlont for justifying the presence of troops
and the maintenance of military bases in several
new republics.
50. The Russian Government still regards ttre
external borders of the member countries of the
CIS as Russian borders. After the attack by the
Tajik Islamic opposition against a border post in
August l994,leadingto the death of four Russian
soldiers, the chief-of-staff of the Russian border
guard units described the situation as " no longer
a domestic issue for Tajikistan " but rather oo a
gauntlet thrown down to Russia oo$. 41fl the Rus-
sian First Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister, Ana-
toli Adamichin, has again described the Tajik-
Afghan frontier as the border of both the CIS and
...Russia " I.
51. In this context, Russian policy tends to pro-
mote recognition of the CIS (in which Russia
feels impelled to play a driving r6le) as a United
Nations regional organisation with the status des-
31. Michael Orr, Peace-keeping 
- 
a new task for Russian
military doctrine, Jane's Intelligence Review, July 1994,
pages 307 - 309.
32. Michael Orr, Peace-keeping 
- 
a new task for Russian
military doctrine, Jane's Intelligence Review, luly 1994,
pages 307-309.
33. Le Monde,2lstl22nd August 1994.
34. Le Monde, 2lstJ22nd August 1994.
cribed in Article 52 of the United Nations Charter.
Its recognition as such by the United Nations
could make the CIS relatively independent as
regards peace-keeping on its own territory and it
is not insignificant that a CIS representative parti-
cipated at a meeting that the United Nations
Secretary-General organised in New York in early
August 1994 with representatives of regional
organisations, at which were also present, inter
alia, representatives of the CSCE, the European
Union, WEU and NATO.
52. In a joint declaration of the ministry for
foreign affairs and ministry of defence of the
Federation of Russia, issued on 29th March 1994,
the Russian leaders stressed that peace-keeping
actions undertaken in the CIS would fully accord
with:
" the provisions of the United Nations
Charter, according to which a possibility of
dealing with matters of peace-making on
the basis of agreements of the states
concemed not only is accepted but welco-
med (Article 52 of the United Nations
Charter). The only exceptions are enforce-
ment actions, which, according to Article
53 of the United Nations Chartet should be
taken under the Security Council's authori-
ty. But all current peace-making operations
on the territory of the former USSR do not
fall under this provision, because they do
not involve enforcement and are taken with
the consent of all conflicting sides. The
United Nations and the CSCE are informed
on these operations on a regular basis.
Russia is consistently favouring the widest
involvement of the United Nations and the
CSCE in the settlement of conflicts in the
CIS counties. There is no need, however,
for any " permission " on the part of the
United Nations and the CSCE to conduct
peace-making operations in accordance
with the abovementioned criteria, in which
Russia and its neighbours take part. The
operations are carried out on the basis of
the sovereign rights of respective states
enshrined in the United Nations Charter
and do not require additional legitimisa-
tion. "
53. Should any doubt remain as to whether all
Russian froop activities in the crisis flashpoints in
the CIS are in line with the above statements, it is
for western authorities to show greater interest
and gteater commifinent in terms of pacification
of the regions in question than they have to date.
It is perhaps too soon to say whether the organisa-
tion of the first joint Russian-American
manoeuwes undertaken in the Ura1s35 in a peace-
T4
35. Frankfurter Allgemeine Z,eitung,3rd September 1994
and Intemational Herald Tribune, Tth September 1994.
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keeping framework can be regarded as the first
sign of increased interest by the West in possible
participation in peace missions in crisis flash-
points in CIS territory. It would also be useful for
Russia and Ewope to enter into consultation on
the division of peace-keeping r6les and tasks
throughout the world; WEU would offer the most
appropriate framework for this.
54. As to the attitude, r6le and rank to which
Russia aspires in affairs of world policy, the coun-
firy's position is not yet fully defined. Notwith-
standing the infighting between the " isola-
tionists o', " neo-Eurasists " and the advocates of
rapprochement with the West, it is abundantly
clear that Russia is determined to play a fulI r6le
arnong the international ranks of the great powers.
It is therefore interested in participating in the
work of all the international bodies and in sfteng-
thening any international organisation offering it
maximum oppornrnity of being associated in the
decision-making process.
55. Moreover, account has to be taken of the
fact that Russia, which regards itself as the prin-
cipal heir to the former Soviet Union, has still
not accepted the loss of major territories 
- 
both
those belonging to the Soviet Union and to the
former Russian empire 
- 
a loss which has, for
example, brought the western borders of Russia
to within a few hundred kilometres of Moscow.
As Mr. Yeltsin stressed in late June 1994, in an
address to students from military academies,
given in the Kremlin, Russia was a Eurasian
state with security interests to protect both in
Europe and in Asia. Russia could not be exemp-
ted from its political and moral responsibility in
relation to the destiny of the countries and
peoples which, for centuries, had marched
alongside the Russian state. Of course, your
Rapporteur doubts whether such an explanation
can justify for instance Azerbaijan being refused
the right to exploit its oil resources, in other
words, to exercise its sovereignty.
56. For a long time, there have been doubts
about there being a consensus in political circles
in the counfiry regarding what was in the national
interest. After the collapse of the former Soviet
Union, President Yeltsin initially pursued a policy
very much directed towards the West. However,
in face of political opposition that accused him of
neglecting national interests 
- 
an ill-defined
concept, even by his opponents 
- 
he started to
define them in a more specific manner. It is now
evident, at least since the Russian-American sum-
mit meeting in September 1994, that Russia
considers the former republics as being within its
sphere of vital interests. Addressing the 49th ses-
sion of the General Assembly of the United
Nations, hesident Yeltsin considered that Rus-
sia's economic and foreign policy priorities were
in the countries of the Commonwealth of Inde-
pendent Statess. He continued that when it was a
question of maintaining peace on the territory of
the forrner Soviet Union, the main burden was the
responsibility of the Russian Federation alone.
The army seems to share this view and military
doctrine provides for the deployment of the army
in countries abroad if national security or Russian
citizens are threatened.
57. The rationale of the Russian approach
requires the government to support the strengthe-
ning of the CSCE and NACC, while remaining
extremely aloof from NATO, opposed even to any
enlargement of that organisation to include the
Central and Eastern European countries. Russia's
attitude to the partnership for peace prograrnme
offered by NAf,O has, from the outset, been ambi-
guous and hesitant. It initiatly welcomed what it
considered to be a means of preventing the acces-
sion of the Central and Eastern European coun-
tries to NATO. However, even though it frnally
signed an accession document to the parhership
for peace, opinions on the usefulness of this
undertaking are still hotly disputed in Moscow,
and the arrangements for participation in the part-
nership, to which the Russians subscribed at
NATO, have not even been made public.
58. Russia's thinking, recently formulated by
its minister for foreign affairs, tends towards
making the CSCE the main collective security
organisation contributing to the maintenance of
security and stability in Europe, with other orga-
nisations such as the CIS, NACC, the European
Union, the Council of Europe, NATO and WEU
subordinate to it. To achieve this, Russia has pro-
posed creating a management body of the CSCE
of the same type as the United Nations Security
Council.
59. It seems clear that these ideas and propo-
sals have no real chance of finding favour with the
majority of Russia's partners in the CSCE, as
already noted at one of the recent meetings, held
in Prague, of the group of senior officials of the
organisation3'. If it appears that Russia's propo-
sals to promote its rapprochement to European
and Atlantic security and defence structures and
to improve the quality of its participation in their
decision-making processes have little chance of
succeeding, there is a strong risk that Russia
might feel increasingly isolated, which cannot be
in anyone's best interest.
60. The problem of Russia's possible isolation
is less acute in the area of economic co-operation
at European and world level than in security mat-
ters and this requires examination, particularly in
the CSCE, NATO and WEU frameworks, in order
to develop guidelines according to which rela-
tions with Russia can progress towards a parmer-
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ship based on informationo consultative and even
co-operative mechanisms. This presupposes in
particular co-ordination between WEU and
NAIO, while taking account of the peculiarities
of each of these organisations.
61. [n order to achieve such an objective, it is
necessary frst to be aware of the political para-
meters and preoccupations of Russia in security
matters. Such assessment should begin with a
study of the Russian military docnine adopted in
November 1993 by the Russian Security Council
and ratified by the President of the Russian Fede-
ration. Analysis of the provisions of this new doc-
trine, the published text of which is merely a sum-
mary of the fundamental principles set out in the
document, and seemingly not a final text, reveals
several passages deserving of attention.
62. It should be noted at the outset that the
tems oo vital interests of the Russian Federation "
are used at least seven times in this document,
without this notion being clearly defined. Thus
the Russian Federation considers it essential to
have armed forces to " defend the sovereignty and
territorial integrity and the vital interests of the
Russian Federation in the case of aggression
against it or its allies; ".
63. The document refers, inter alia, to " territo-
rial claims by other states on the Russian Federa-
tion and its allies; " as the main sources of danger,
in military terms and from without, for the Rus-
sian Federation. This may apply specifically
to on-going disputes with Estonia and Latvia
because of the former's territorial claims on
Russia, resolution of which must be sought
around the " regional tables " ofthe conference on
the stability pact.
64. The Russian military doctrine also inveighs
against the danger of " suppression ofrights, free-
doms and legitimate interest of citizens of the
Russian Federation in foreign countries ", which
can be applied not only to the problems of Rus-
sian-speaking nationals in Estonia and Latvia, but
also in other " near abroad o' countries where
approximately 25 million Russian nationals live.
65. One crucial point is the severe criticism of
any o'expansion of military blocs and alliances to
the deniment of the interess of military security of
the Russian Federation ". It should be recalled in
this connection that Russia continues to regard
NATO as a military bloc and is therefore not in
favour of an enlargement of this organisation to the
East which would exclude Russia. Russia does not,
however, take a negative position on enlargement
of the European Union to include the Central and
Eastern European countries, but it is more ambi-
guous when it comes to enlargement of WEU.
66. It should be recalled in this connection that
when WEU granted the nine Cenral and Eastern
European countries a status of association, the
Russian minister for foreign affairs issued a decla-
ration to the press on 12th May 1994 to the effect
that this decision by WEU:
" ... cannot be evaluated in a one-dimensio-
nal fashion. We see this as an attempt to
find some new form of military and politi-
cal co-operation within a defined area of
Europe. This is in contradiction with the
need to establish a truly pan-European sys-
tem of security and stability. It is wrong to
bank on co-operation where there is no
place for a counfiry like Russia. If this rend
is confirmed, it will carry with it the danger
of creating artificial barriers, of a new divi-
sion of Europe.
We are in favour of another way, one based
on the principles of a truly broad co-opera-
tion between all European states. We are in
favour of WEU becoming an in-prospect
component of pan-European security struc-
tures under the auspices of the CSCE. We
wish to stress once again Russia's earnest
interest in developing constructive dia-
logue and practical co-operation with WEU
and its member states. "
67. The contacts pursued on this subject in the
meantime between the representatives of Europe
and Russia seem to indicate that the latter might
accept a gradual convergence between the coun-
ries in question and WEU on condition that this is
not a pretext for bringing them into NAIO by the
back door.
68. Among the other sources of concern can be
counted the dangers resulting from " the increase in
contingents deployed on the borders of the Russian
Federation to such a level as to destroy the estab-
lished balance of forces " and oo the introduction of
foreign troops into the tenitory of states bordering
on Russia (if not linked to peace-enforcement or
peace-keeping measures in conformity with a deci-
sion of ttre United Nations Security Council or a
regional collective security organisation with the
agreement of the Russian Federation) ". It will be
recalled that Russia had argued in this connection
that any deployment of NAIO forces in the territo-
ries of the countries of the former Warsaw Pact
" 2 + 4" treaty on final setflement of the German
question which prohibis NATO forces being sta-
tioned in the territory of the former GDR without
authorisation from the German Government.
69. The signifrcance must also be evaluated of
the Russian military docffine as regards the use of
nuclear weapons and the use of Russian armed
forces in the event of attack against Russian citi-
zens, a large number of whom live abroad.
70. Morever, a large number of other questions
will need to be clarified in the framework of a
more intensive dialogue between the western
authorities and the Russian leadership; these
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include, first and foremost, the importance that
Russia attaches to its relations with the United
States, which has provided it with vital help,
through a trilateral agreement, in resolving the
problems of the military denuclearisation of
Ukraine, a country that is still Russia's most
important and difficult partner. Russian policy
towards Ukraine is somewhat less than franspa-
rent to a western observer and the future evolution
of Russian policies towards the Baltic countries is
equally uncertain.
71. Many experts believe Russia's conduct
towards Belarus, and in particular, Ukraine,
reveals the imperialist or non-imperialist nature of
Russian policy. Regarding the latter, which is a
very important factor in Russian history Russians
on the whole have difficulty in realising that this
territory where they find their roots and origins
can become an independent and foreign state. It is
therefore necessary to look closely at the Russian
attitude towards the questions of the Black Sea
Fleet, the autonomy of Crimea or the linking up of
the eastern part of Ukraine, where the majority of
the population is Russian and where the new Pre-
sident of Ukraine, Leonid Kutchma, obtained the
most votes.
72. Regarding relations between Russia and
the United States, in recent months a tacit agree-
ment seems to have taken shape between the
two countries, in particular at the last American/
Russian meeting, on their respective zones of
influence in the CIS, Latin America and the
Caribbean. European countries, and in particular
WEU, should analyse this tendency very carefully
and prepare a response because inaction by Europe
might encourage the idea in Russia that only the
United States is a political partner of equal stand-
ing. Russian/American domination would then be
inevitable.
73. Because of the conflicts in the Caucasus,
Russia requested that the provisions of the CFE
Treaty concerning deployment of troops on the
southern flank should be amended; however, ano-
ther major question remains outstanding, namely,
how Russia intends in future to use its enclave in
the Kaliningrad region, which it has declared a
special defence zone, causing particular concern
to the Baltic countries, primarily Lithuania as a
transit country, and to Poland.
74. For Poland and, even more, for Lithuania,
the question of an agreement with Russia on mili-
tary transit to and from its Kaliningrad enclave is
serious cause for concern about their national
security3s. If asked to monitor arrangements for
this transit, the wEU council would have to take
such a proposal very seriously. It should be recal-
led that WEU had already shown its ability in
such matters with its contribution to ensure res-
pect for the resolution of the united Nations secu-
rity Council on the embargo on the Danube.
Regarding relations between the Baltic countries
and Russia, it should also be noted that with the
Skundra radar station, Russia maintains a pre-
sence in Latvia although its troops left the country
on 31st August 1994. Some territorial questions
still remain to be resolved between Russia and
Estonia.
75. Another subject of prime importance is
Russia's r61e in relation to attempts at international
level to find a solution to the conflict in former
Yugoslavia, where Russia has played such an acti-
ve part that it is inconceivable that this conflict can
be resolved without its involvement. This is bound
to have an effect on Russia's ambitions as regards
settlement of future conflicts of the same type.
76. As to Russian policy towards the defence
industry and armaments production and export,
whereas concerns were previously concentrated
on the conversion of military assets to civil use, it
would appear that a new policy has since been
adopted directed towards increasing exports, a
policy which, according to Mr. Kozyrev, consti-
tutes an essential component of Russia's foreign
policy. Russia has some reason for concern when
it sees the countries of the Visegrad Group and
several other countries of Central and Eastern
Europe turn towards NATO for their military pro-
curement. Indeed, Russia has already lost a very
large part of the armaments market.
77. The military-industrial complex including
the Russian nuclear industry, is in a period of
great change. This time of uncertainty in an indus-
trial sector that was a major stake in the economic
policy of the former Soviet Union is a threat to
world security. First, it is increasing the danger of
a black market in nuclear and military equipment.
WEU should perhaps look more closely at this
problem.
78. Regarding Russian commitments towards
Asia, particular note should be taken of the arran-
gement recently reached with China with the aim
of establishing a new partnership, one of the
essential elements of which is the decision by the
two countries to cease Eaining their missiles on
the other's territory. Relations with Japan are still
difficult because of the unresolved problem of the
Kuril islands, however, it is apparent that Russia
is seeking to develop productive relations with
several Asian partners, among which the ASEAN
countrieso and specifically with India, to which it
provides aid, particularly in the area of ballistic
missile production technology 
- 
regularly giving
rise to negative reactions on the part of the United
States. The impression is, however, that the centre
of gravity of Russian policy remains Europe and
the United States, which opens wide the door to
the development of concepts for intensifying dia-
logue with Russia.38. Atlantic News, 2659, 5th October 1994.
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IV. Some guid.elines
for the development of relatians between WEU
and the Russinn Federalian
79. At present, matters are still at the stage of
declarations of intent. Thus the communiqu6 of
the WEU Council of Ministers, issued in Luxem-
bourg on 9th May 1994, states that " ministers, in
the context of the growing r6le of WEU in pro-
moting peace, security and stability in Europe,
agreed on the importance of developing dialogue
and exchanges of information on issues of com-
mon concern between WEU and Russia. " Given
the very meagre substance of this declaration,
the Permanent Council in Brussels should be
requested to give clarification. In particular, infor-
mation should be given on the content of recent
contacts betrveen the WEU Secretary-General and
the Russian Embassy in Brussels and/or on other
contacts between WEU and the Russian
authorities.
80. On the Russian side, several signs denoting
an increasing interest by the authorities of that
country in WEU are observable. First, representa-
tives of the two chambers of the Russian Parlia-
ment participated in the colloquy organised by the
Assembly on 17th October 1994 and then met
with the Political, Defence and Presidential Com-
mittees in Paris. Moreover, the participation of a
delegation of Russian parliamentarians at the next
Assembly session seems virtually certain.
81. Regarding the policy of the Russian
Government, the Russian Embassy has recently
provided information about a document defining
that country's policy towards WEU. This docu-
ment, which would appear to have been approved
by the Russian Head of State on 9th June 1994,
may be summarised as follows:
Russiaos aims would appear to be:
(i) to establish special partnership rela-
tions between Russia and WEU, the
objective being to synchronise co-
operation with WEU and the develop-
ment of relations between Russia and
the European Union in economic and
political matters. It is not a matter of
replicating the status of the associate
partner countries of WEU but of a
stable parErership with Western Euro-
pe in political and military matters;
(iil to give more regular form to Russia's
contacts with WEU through meetings
between Russian foreign affairs and
defence ministers and the Secretariat-
General and the ministers of the
countries holding the Presidency of
that organisation;
(iii) to pursue further the institutionalisa-
tion of a consultation mechanism bet-
ween Russia and WEU, parallel to
that existing between Russia and the
European Union. Such consultations
would concern current problems rela-
ting to European and international
security. A start could be made with
discussions on peace-keeping mat-
ters, the Yugoslav crisis and the pact
on stability in Europe. Moreover,
possibilities might be raised of co-
operation with Western Europe on
defence matters, particularly co-ope-
ration on tactical missile defence;
(iv) bearngin mind that the WEU Assem-
. bly plays an important part in defining
the future evolution of the Union, to
contribute to developing stable links
between the Russian Federal Assem-
bly and the WEU Assembly;
(v) to establish contacts between Ros
Voorongenie (the Institute assigned
responsibility by the presidency for
studying the problem of arms sales,
chaired by General chaposhnikov)
and WEAG;
(vi) to take measures towards establishing
co-operation, on a commercial basis,
between the Tonej6n Satellite Cenfre
and the Russian ministry of defence
and other bodies working in this area;
(vii) to develop exchanges, including joint
events, between Russian scientific
centres and the WEU Institute for
Security Studies.
82. It goes without saying that all of these sug-
gestions should be examined with particular care.
A basic factor of note, it would appear that the
Russian use of the term " partnership " is entirely
in the sense WEU would wish. The vital interest
which the establishment of relations with Russia
should present for WEU lies in the setting up of a
regular political dialogue the purpose of which
must be to exchange information in order to
improve transparency and establish a climate of
confidence.
83. The WEU approach is determined by the
organisation's r6le as an integral part of the deve-
lopment of the European Union and European
pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. Its frst objective
must be confidence-building and the avoidance of
a feeling of isolation on the part of the Russians.
84. As to the nature of the dialogue, a system of
mutual information must first be established
which might develop into one of consultation and
even 
- 
dependidg on how matters progress 
-
move towards co-operation in certain specific
areas to be determined. A decision must also be
taken in this context as to whether it is hoped to
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the same degree to establish relations with
Ukraine, Belarus and other CIS countries. Sub-
jects for inclusion in the framework of the dia-
logue are those falling within WEU's area of res-
ponsibility on the basis of the modified Brussels
Treaty and this approach should be in parallel
with that of the European Union, and complemen-
tary to the relations which NATO is preparing to
develop with Russia.
85. One of the main objectives of this dialogue
with Russia should be to allay Russian fears by an
asisurance to the effect that the Central and Eas-
tern European countries' moving closer to WEU
and the enlargement of the European Union to the
Scandinavian countries and Austria do not consti-
tute any danger whatsoever for Russia's own
interests and will not have the effect of establish-
ing new demarcation lines across Eastem Europe.
In fact, it should be made clear to the Russian side
that stable and reliable political conditions in
Eastern and Central Europe conffibute to Russian
security and are therefore in its own interest.
86. [n order to achieve this, it would be useful
to support every effort tending to give Russia the
widest possible participation in decision-making
in other forums; furthermore, the proposals Rus-
sia has put forward for the transformation of the
CSCE should not be rejected out of hand, but
should be the subject of consultations on the basis
of counter-proposals developed in Western Euro-
pe, WEU having an important contribution to
make in this area.
87. The Russian proposals to discuss peace-
keeping matters, the Yugoslav crisis and the stabi-
lity pact seem entirely acceptable, but should be
supplemented by other subjects for discussion, for
example, joint risk assessment, disamrament, the
problems of dismantling chemical arsenals in
Russia, the proliferation of nuclear material,
arnaments export potcy, etc.
88. [t should not be forgotten that in all the
more specific areas proposed by Russia, such as
for example anti-missile defence co-operation,
co-operation with WEAG and the Torrej6n Satel-
lite Centre, a large part of this co-operation still
takes place in WEU within fairly restricted frame-
works, from which a certain number of associate
or observer countries are excluded. It is therefore
necessary to avoid giving Russia a more privile-
ged position than WEU observer or associate part-
ner countries. It should be recalled, however, that
technical co-operation between WEU and Russia
already exists in the framework of the implemen-
tation of the Open Skies Treaty. The WEU Coun-
cil should consider if, and to what extent, bilateral
co-operation of certain member countries with
Russia might be developed in the area of defence
equipment and the defence industry so as to offer
it co-operation specifically in areas where WEU
has developed initiatives.
89. The Russian proposal on the organisation
of exchanges and joint events involving Russian
research institutes, many of which are exfremely
prestigious, and the WEU Institute for Security
Studies, seems especially useful and should be
very warrnly welcomed.
90. Regarding the modalities of the dialogue,
consideration should be given as to how institu-
tionalised it should be. It will be advisable, for
various reasons, not to seek to make it too formal
in order to retain a certain freedom of action and
initiative, as circumstances demand. From ano-
ther point of view, it is important not to give the
Russians the impression that they are being held
at a distance; a degree of institutionalisation could
therefore be useful, both at parliamentary level
and in intergovernmental relations. Within the
framework of the European Union's agreement
with Russia, it has been decided to create a" pa*-
Iiamentary co-operation committee " which would
determine the frequency of its own meetings.
There are also provisions for holding summit
meetings twice yearly between the President of
the Union and the Russian hesident, and for the
creation of a co-operation council which will meet
annually. There will also be regular meetings of
top civil servants.
91. The Russian proposals dealing with the ins-
titutionalisation of the mechanism of consultation
between Russia and WEU should be studied care-
fully, however, at the present stage the time for
reaching definitive conclusions does not as yet
seem ripe. However, it would appear essential at
the very least to establish regular meetings bet-
ween the Russian Parliament and the WEU
Assembly.
V. Conclasians
92. The Political Committee's impressions
during its recent visit to Russia are varied: on the
one hand it heard Mr. Churkin, Deputy Minister
for Foreign Affairs of Russia, express the convic-
tion that the 21st century would be Russia's cen-
tury. Again, it was struck by the silence among the
students of the lnstitute for International Rela-
tions in Moscow when a member of the commit-
tee asked them for their views on the future evo-
lution of Russia and the CIS as a whole.
93. Furthermore, its meetings with the various
bodies revealed that Russians still knew very
little about the r6le and duties of WEU and its
Assembly in the European and transatlantic fra-
mework. The feelings that emerged from most of
the meetings were fear of isolation and being side-
lined by the European institutions, persistent mis-
trust of NATO and hostility to the enlargement of
NATO towards Central Europe and the wish to
make itself better known in the West.
T9
DOCIJMENT 1440
94. Reverting to more specific questions, one
must take very seriously the inforrnation provided
by Russian parliamentarians on the difficulties of
the Russian authorities, despite their goodwill, in
tackling the destruction of enormous arsenals of
chemical weapons.In the framework of the deve-
lopment of relations between WEU and Russia,
the Council should examine the question of the
extent to which its member countries might offer
the Russian authorities their assistance in this
matter. Furthermore, it appears that several mem-
ber countries of WEU have concluded or are
negotiating bilateral agreements with Russia in
various areas of military co-operation, although
the Assembly has not been informed of this. It
would be essential for the WEU Council to ensu-
re co-ordination between these various initiatives
and keep the Assembly informed. Any sfrengthe-
ning of relations between WEU and Russia should
replace the lack of knowledge by information,
mistrust by confidence and the feeling of isolation
on the Russian side by the building of a European
security architecture in which Russia might find a
place commensurate with its importance.
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